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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the question of how couples should
be taxed. One reason for the importance of this issue is simply that
the overwhelming majority of individuals live in households formed
around couples, and so it could be argued that empirically, this is the
single most important problem in personal income taxation. A second
reason is that the economic theory of optimal taxation and tax reform,
at least as it is presented in the mainstream literature, provides little
guidance on this issue, resting as it does on models of the single person
household. An old insight in the earlier public ￿nance literature is that
any discussion of the taxation of two-person households necessarily in-
volves the recognition of the importance of household production. In
this paper we try to show how a simple model of household production
can be used to help the analysis of optimal taxation and tax reform,
and to put the "conventional wisdom", which says that it is optimal
to tax women on a separate, lower tax schedule than men, on a ￿rmer
basis. What emerges clearly from the analysis is how centrally impor-
tant the relationship between productivity in household production
and female labour supply really is, and how little we know about it
empirically.
JEL Classi￿cation: H21, D13, J22
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1 Introduction
The large growth in female labour force participation that occurred in the
1950￿ s to 1980￿ s has made the question of taxing two-earner households one
of the central issues in tax policy, yet it is relatively neglected in the theoret-
ical literature.1 This paper summarises and extends the main results in the
(rather small) journal literature, placing some emphasis on the importance
of household production and its relevance to the taxation problem.
Attention tends to focus on the relative merits of joint taxation (income
splitting), individual taxation and selective taxation. Under the ￿rst, incomes
are added together, divided by two, and the resulting average income taxed
according to a given tax schedule. Under the second, the couple￿ s incomes
are taxed separately but on the same rate schedule. Under the third, not only
are incomes taxed separately, but the tax schedules also di⁄er. The paper
by Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) is generally regarded as having established
the conventional wisdom in this area, namely that selective, and not joint,
or even independent, taxation is optimal.2 That is, not only should women
be taxed separately from men, but they should be taxed on a lower rate
schedule. This conventional wisdom was challenged by Piggott and Whalley
(1996), who argued for the second best optimality of joint taxation, but Apps
and Rees (1999b) show that their argument is ￿ awed.
Nonetheless, we suggest in the following section of this paper that, though
perhaps intuitively appealing, the Boskin-Sheshinski analysis itself does not
establish a solid basis for the conventional wisdom. The general conclusion
that tax rates on men and women should di⁄er is almost certainly correct.
That is, joint taxation is optimal in a set of cases of measure zero. How-
ever, their argument that the tax rate on women should be lower is open to
question. In the kind of model that Boskin and Sheshinski use, we cannot
rule out the possibility that, although on e¢ ciency grounds alone their result
1For example it is not discussed at all in two leading public ￿nance texts, Myles (1995)
and SalaniØ (2003), nor in the survey by Auerbach and Hynes (2002), while it is mentioned
as an important issue, but not further analysed, in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1988).
2See also Feldstein and Feenberg (1996).
2holds,3 the female tax rate could be a better instrument of income redistri-
bution across households than the male tax rate, and equity e⁄ects could
outweigh e¢ ciency e⁄ects to result in a higher tax rate on women. However,
we show that if there is positive assortative matching, in the sense that the
female wage rate increases with the male wage rate across households, and
if the covariance across households between the marginal social utility of in-
come and the di⁄erence between male and female earnings is negative, then
the tax rate on men should certainly be higher than that on women. Since
the empirical evidence appears to provide support for these conditions, this
places the conventional wisdom on a much ￿rmer basis.
However, the model used by Boskin and Sheshinski su⁄ers from the lim-
itation that it ignores household production. Thus in their model household
wage income is an accurate indicator of household utility possibilities. If we
take account of household production and the considerable across-household
heterogeneity in female labour supply that in fact exists, household income
becomes a much less reliable indicator of household utility possibilities,4 and
a linear tax system based on market income may generate signi￿cant in-
equities, even if these are not so great as under a joint tax system. We show
this in section 4, having developed in section 3 a simple model of household
production.
A possible reason for the intuitive appeal of the conventional wisdom,
apart from the evidence on male and female labour supply elasticities, may
be an assumption about the within-household income distribution. It may be
thought that a system in which, however low her income, the tax rate on the
￿rst dollar a wife earns is that paid on the last dollar the husband earns5 in
some way worsens the allocation of household resources that the wife obtains.
For example, it reduces her net wage and therefore her terms of trade within
the household.6 Anyone wanting to argue along these lines has to construct
a household model that shows how the within-household income distribution
is determined, and how this is a⁄ected by the tax system. A problem here
is that no consensus appears to exist on such a model among the economists
working in this area, and no comprehensive or robust empirical estimates
3Consistent with the intuition of Munnell (1980) and Rosen (1977).
4As recognised by Munnell (1980).
5At least to a close approximation. There may be a tax-free allowance on an initial
band of the wife￿ s earned income, as in Germany.
6See Apps (1982), for development of this point in the context of a Walrasian model.
For an approach based on Nash bargaining, see Gugl (2004).
3exist of the parameters we would need to know.
From the point of view of the optimal linear tax analysis carried out in
the next section, if we took account of the household￿ s internal resource al-
location, terms representing the e⁄ects of changes in the tax rates on the
distribution of income within the household would appear in the ￿rst or-
der conditions that determine the optimal tax rates. The planner￿ s social
welfare function is de￿ned on individual utilities, but these can only be in-
￿ uenced indirectly, via the e⁄ect of the tax instruments on the household￿ s
allocation process. In Apps and Rees (1988) we show that the assumption
allowing us to ignore these terms is that the household distributes its income
in exactly the way that the central planner would wish it to.7 By making
this assumption, we can sidestep the issue of the within-household income
distribution. This implies in turn that it is su¢ cient to follow Boskin and
Sheshinski in using a "household utility function" as the representation of
household preferences. This can be done as long as we want only to focus
on how the across-household income distribution a⁄ects optimal tax rates.
We would argue that the problem of clarifying the relationships among fe-
male labour supply, household production, household utility possibilities and
optimal taxes is su¢ ciently complex as to justify postponing analysis of the
use of the tax system as a means of in￿ uencing the within-household income
distribution.
2 The Boskin-Sheshinski Model
This model, based on the optimal linear income tax analysis of Sheshinski
(1972), could be viewed as making the smallest possible extension to the
model of the individual worker/consumer just necessary to analyse taxation
of two-person households. Its main contribution is to make precise the intu-
ition that selective taxation could be optimal because the elasticity of female
labour supply is higher than that of male labour supply.
A household has the utility function u(y;lf;lm); where y is a market
consumption good, and li ￿ 0; i = f;m; is the labour supply of household
7This is called "non-dissonance" in Apps and Rees (1988).
4member8 i: The household faces the budget constraint




where a is the lump sum transfer in a linear tax system and ti is the mar-
ginal tax rate on i0s gross income xi ￿ wili, with wi the exogenously given
gross market wage. Thus a household is characterised by a pair of wage rates
(wf;wm); otherwise households are identical. Since this is a linear tax prob-
lem we do not have to assume that a household￿ s wage pair is observable.
There is a given population joint density function f(wf;wm); everywhere





+; which tells us how households are
distributed according to the innate productivities in market work of their
members, as measured by their market wage rates.
To focus attention on what we regard as the most important aspects of the
results, we assume that the household utility function9 takes the quasilinear
form




i > 0; i = f;m
which, however, we ￿nd more convenient to write in terms of gross incomes
u = y ￿ vf(xf) ￿ vm(xm); vi(xi) ￿ ui(
xi
wi
) i = f;m
Solving the household￿ s utility maximisation problemyields demands y(a;tf;tm);
















is a compensated derivative, because of the absence of income e⁄ects. For
the same reason, it is straightforward to con￿rm that labour supplies and
gross incomes are strictly increasing in the wage rate and decreasing in the
8Although it could just as well be thought of as referring to a single individual with
two sorts of labour supply or leisure.
9Clearly the model can say nothing about the within-household welfare distribution,
as discussed in the Introduction.
5tax rate. Thus household utility is strictly increasing in household income.
Note that the choice of utility function sets the e⁄ects of one partner￿ s wage
on the labour supply of the other to zero. This makes it much easier to
derive the main insights of the analysis without doing too much injustice to
the facts.10
To ￿nd the optimal tax system we introduce the social welfare function
W(:); which is strictly increasing, strictly concave and di⁄erentiable in the






subject to the tax revenue constraint
ZZ
￿
[tfxf + tmxm]f(wf;wm)dwfdwm ￿ a ￿ G ￿ 0
where G ￿ 0 is a per household revenue requirement. The ￿rst order condi-







where ￿ > 0 is the marginal social cost of tax revenue and W
0=￿ the marginal
social utility of income to a household with characteristic (wf;wm): Thus
the optimal a equates the average marginal social utility of income to the
marginal cost of the lump sum. We denote a household￿ s marginal social
utility of income W
0=￿ by s; and its mean by ￿ s: Thus the condition sets
￿ s = 1: Because of the assumptions on W(:); households with relatively low
wage pairs will have values of s above the average, those with relatively high
wage pairs, below.
The ￿rst order conditions on the marginal tax rates, using the above









10Empirical evidence seems to suggest no signi￿cant e⁄ects of a wife￿ s wage on husband￿ s











is the covariance of the marginal social utility of household income and the











is the average compensated derivative of gross income with respect to the
tax rate, and is negative.
Now the argument that t￿
f < t￿
m is based on the empirical evidence sug-
gesting that ￿￿ x
0
f > ￿￿ x
0
m; but this clearly considers only part of the optimal
tax formula, and is in general neither necessary nor su¢ cient for the result.
In other words, though taxing women at a given rate creates a higher aver-
age deadweight loss than taxing men at the same rate, the policy maker￿ s
willingness to trade o⁄ e¢ ciency for equity might imply that the tax rate
on women could optimally be higher than that on men, if the covariance
between the marginal social utility of household income and women￿ s gross
income is in absolute value su¢ ciently higher than that of men, so that the
corresponding redistributive e⁄ects make that worthwhile.
This indeterminacy is also of course present in Boskin and Sheshinski￿ s
paper, though the greater generality and complexity of their model perhaps
makes it less obvious. In order to be able to say something more de￿nite, they
take a model based on speci￿c social welfare and household utility functions
and "plausible" parameter values, and solve numerically for the marginal tax
rates. The result is that the male marginal tax rate is higher than the female.
One example seems to us to constitute a very inadequate basis for an
entire conventional wisdom. It is certainly true that equality of the marginal
tax rates appears as a highly special case, requiring equality of the ratios
of equity and e¢ ciency terms in each case, and so joint taxation is almost
certain to be suboptimal, but the results of this model so far do not make
a conclusive case for taxing women at a lower rate than men. The optimal
tax analysis suggests a departure from income splitting, but it does not tell
us much about the appropriate direction of this departure. In fact, the
analysis is unnecessary to give the basic result, since joint taxation amounts
to imposing on the optimal tax problem the constraint that the marginal
7tax rates be equal, and such a constraint cannot increase the value of the
objective function at the optimum.
To make this a little more precise, write
Cov[s;xi] = ￿i￿i￿s i = f;m
with ￿i the correlation coe¢ cient between s and xi; ￿i the standard deviation
















It is an open question empirically, whether this condition is satis￿ed. All
we can really conclude from Boskin and Sheshinski￿ s example is that the
assumed functional forms and parameter values lead to satisfaction of this
condition.
However, we can take the discussion further and put the conventional
wisdom on a ￿rmer foundation if we assume:
Assortative matching: across households, the female wage is a monotonic
increasing function of the male wage;
Diverging incomes: as the male wage increases, the couple￿ s earnings
di⁄erence xm ￿ xf increases monotonically.
Then we have
Proposition 2: Assortative matching and diverging incomes are su¢ -
cient (given ￿￿ x
0
f > ￿￿ x
0
m) to ensure t￿
f < t￿
m:
Proof: We can write





Given assortative matching, we know that s is falling monotonically with wm
while given diverging incomes we know that xm ￿ xf is increasing monoton-
ically with wm; thus Cov[s;xm ￿ xf] < 0; and so
￿Cov[s;xm] > ￿Cov[s;xf] (2)
and the male covariance is higher in absolute value. Hence the male tax rate
is both more e⁄ective as a redistributive instrument and less costly in terms
of deadweight loss, and so it will be optimally higher than the female.
8The empirical evidence11 suggests that, at least in the most developed
countries, assortative matching and diverging incomes are reasonable as-
sumptions, and so we have a more solid foundation for the conventional
wisdom.
An important limitation of the Boskin-Sheshinski model, as our discus-
sion in the introduction suggests, is that it omits household production. Why
should this matter? After all, it could be argued, all that is really important
are the labour supply (gross income) derivatives and the covariance of gross
income with the marginal social utility of household income. Whether sub-
stitution at the margin is between market work and leisure, or market work
and household production, is, on this argument, just a matter of detail that
does not really have substantive implications.
What makes this argument untenable is the large variation across house-
holds in female labour supply12 and the implication that gross income may
well not correctly re￿ ect utility possibilities. In the Boskin-Sheshinski model,
the household￿ s utility possibilities necessarily increase with household mar-
ket income, which is therefore an appropriate welfare measure for purposes
of income taxation. A central consequence of taking account of household
production, in a way that also explains the empirical evidence on female
labour supply, is that household income may be a poor, and possibly neg-
ative, indicator of household welfare, which in turn should have important
policy implications. In the next section we set up a simple household model
incorporating household production, and use it in the rest of this paper to
explore issues in the taxation of couples, beginning with an extension of the
optimal linear taxation model.
3 The Household Production Model
We introduce domestic goods zi produced respectively by i = f;m, with each
being consumed by both members of the household, and write the household
utility function now as
u = y + ￿(zf) + ￿(zm)
11See Apps and Rees (2008).
12See for example Rees (2007) for the case of Germany and Apps and Rees (2008) for
the additional four countries USA, UK, Sweden and Australia.
9The household good zf is produced according to the production function
zf = khf
where the productivity parameter k 2 [k0;k1] ￿ R+ varies across households,
and hf is the time f spends in domestic production. We assume that males
in all households are equally productive in household production, because we
want to take the primary e⁄ect of productivity variation across households
to be on female labour supply. By choice of units, we can therefore set the
time spent by m in household production,13 hm = zm: The implicit price, p;










The price of zm is q = (1￿tm)wm: The individuals have time constraints
li + hi = 1 i = f;m
where total time is normalised at 1. The household budget constraint is
y = a + (1 ￿ tf)wflf + (1 ￿ tm)wmlm
which, using the time constraints, can be written as
y + pzf + qzm = Y
where Y ￿ a+(1￿tf)wf+(1￿tm)wm is the household￿ s net full income. From
this budget constraint it is clear that two households with identical male and
female wage rates and di⁄ering values of k will have di⁄ering utility possi-
bilities, with the household with the lower value of p; i.e. the higher female
productivity in domestic production, having the higher budget constraint.
This is made explicit if we solve the household￿ s utility maximisation
problem to obtain the demand functions y(p;q;Y ); zf(p); zm(q) and its indi-










13What distinguishes zm from "leisure" is that it is consumed by both individuals. It
may, but need not, be a household public good.
10Then obviously the higher the value of k and therefore (for equal female wage
rate) the lower is p; the higher the household￿ s utility. For the interpretation






= ￿wili i = f;m
Of key importance is the relation between female market labour supply,
and therefore household market labour income, and the productivity para-
meter k: Unfortunately, this is in general ambiguous. Thus we have















The ￿rst term is positive, and re￿ ects the e⁄ect of increasing productivity
in reducing the time required to produce a given domestic output. The
second term is negative, since demand for domestic output increases as its
price falls, and increasing k reduces the price of the domestic good. Thus
increasing productivity reduces the time needed to produce a given level of
domestic output but increases the demand for it, so the net outcome depends
on the relative strength of these two e⁄ects. Noting that @p=@k = ￿p=k; we






where e is the price elasticity of demand of the domestic good. Thus if this
demand is elastic (e > 1), female labour supply decreases with productivity,
while it increases in the converse case. Moreover, we can derive a very simple
relationship between the elasticity of female labour supply with respect to





Thus if we know a household￿ s female labour supply elasticity and the ratio
of market to domestic labour supply, we can predict how variations in its
domestic productivity a⁄ect female labour supply.
114 Optimal Linear Taxation
Turning now to the optimal linear tax analysis,14 we extend the Boskin-
Sheshinski model in the simplest possible way. First, we adopt the assump-
tion of assortative matching, as set out in the previous section. Because of
this we from now on write the male wage simply as w 2 [w0;w1] ￿ R+:




+: A value of the male wage w corresponds now to
a pair of wage rates. Recall that the higher is k, the lower is the implicit
price of the household good and so the higher must be the household￿ s utility
possibilities.






subject to the revenue constraint
ZZ
￿
[tfwflf + wtmlm]f(k;w)dkdw ￿ a ￿ G ￿ 0







and so, again denoting the marginal social utility of income to a household
by s; we have its expected value ￿ s = 1: The condition with respect to the









14See Sandmo (1990) for an analysis of optimal linear income taxation in the presence of
household production. The key di⁄erences to the present paper are that he was concerned
with single-person households and assumed the household good was a perfect substitute


















Super￿cially, the results look very similar to those derived in the Boskin-
Sheshinski model. While however the denominator terms have the same
meanings as before, in fact there are crucial di⁄erences, essentially to do
with the distributional terms in the numerators.15 The male tax rate is
una⁄ected by the introduction of household production, because xm does
not vary with k: However, the value of Cov[s;xf] now depends crucially ￿rst,
on the relationship between w and k; and secondly, on that between female
labour supply, and hence xf; and k: We can distinguish four cases:
Case 1: w and k vary positively with each other, and lf varies positively
with k:
This is the case in which the female￿ s productivity in market and in
household production are positively related, and where her higher domestic
productivity allows her to supply more time to the market.16 Then, as in
the Boskin-Sheshinski model, Cov[s;xf] < 0; and tf > 0: We can also derive
the counterpart of Proposition 2: tf < tm if xm ￿ xf increases with w: So
in this case nothing much qualitatively is added by introducing household
production.
Case 2: w and k vary positively with each other, and lf varies inversely
with k:
In this case, the elasticity of demand for the household good is su¢ ciently
high that female labour supply falls as k increases, other things being equal.
This will therefore reduce the extent to which xf increases as w increases, and
so strengthens Proposition 2. Moreover, it is even possible that Cov[s;xf]
becomes positive, implying a negative female tax rate. For this to happen,
the e⁄ect of increasing k on reducing lf must be su¢ ciently strong that gross
15This does tell us that introduction of household production is not essential as long as
our only concern is with deadweight loss, i.e. e¢ ciency rather than equity. On the other
hand the fact that substitution between market work and non-market work is what really
determines female labour supply elasticities may well have implications for econometric
model speci￿cations.
16Recall the discussion in section 2 earlier.
13income xf actually falls as w and k increase, therefore causing s and xf to
move in the same direction across households. In this case, a positive female
tax rate would be a regressive instrument of welfare redistribution.
Case 3: w and k vary inversely with each other, and lf varies positively
with k:
This is the case in which a woman￿ s market and household productivity
vary inversely17 It seems plausible to assume that the increase in wage rates
would outweigh the falling k in raising household utility and so reducing s.
Reducing k will at least partially o⁄set increasing w in increasing xf; so, as
in Case 2, we have a strengthening of Proposition 2, with even the possibility
of a negative optimal tax rate for women.
Case 4: w and k vary inversely with each other, and lf varies inversely
with k:
Assuming, as in Case 3, that with increasing w we still have falling s; we
also now have that xf is certainly increasing, and so this case is essentially
similar to case 1.
Finally, we have the result that the kind of vertical inequity in the joint
taxation system pointed out by Munnell (1980) does not disappear in the
optimal linear tax system, though it would be moderated. Thus consider, in
a joint taxation system, two households with the same gross income. They
pay the same tax under this system. Suppose however that one household has
zero female labour supply and the entire income is earned by the male spouse,
while in the other both labour supplies are positive. Given that the ￿rst
household has a higher wage, it must have the lower marginal social utility
of income, unless female labour supply increases with household productivity,
and the value of k is so much higher in the second household than the ￿rst,
that it has the higher utility possibilities. If this is not the case, joint taxation
is regressive.
Under selective taxation, the second household would face a lower tax
bill than the ￿rst, because the male in this household would pay less tax on
his lower gross income, and the female would pay less tax still, both because
of her lower gross income and because tf < tm: Thus moving from joint to
selective taxation (though not to independent taxation in a simple linear
tax system, since this is equivalent to joint taxation) would go some way
17We may think this case to be empirically less likely, because the higher the household￿ s
wage rates the higher might be its physical capital as well as the wife￿ s human capital,
both of which might be expected to increase her productivity in household production,
but a priori we cannot rule the case out.
14to correcting the regressivity of the joint tax system in this regard. Note
that the introduction of household production is what allows us to reject
gross household income as an adequate measure of the household￿ s utility
possibilities. In the next section we look more closely at the e⁄ects of a
switch from joint to independent taxation by presenting it as a problem in
tax reform.
Finally, even under optimal selective taxation, in the case where female
labour supply varies inversely with domestic productivity, there could still
be a great deal of vertical inequity in the tax system, essentially because
the female income tax rate captures the e⁄ects of variation in domestic pro-
ductivity only very imperfectly. Take two households with the same wage
rates and therefore male gross incomes. The household with the lower fe-
male gross income, and therefore smaller total tax bill, will actually have the
higher level of utility possibilities. The importance of such inequity in reality
obviously depends on the direction and strength of the relation between do-
mestic productivity and female labour supply, about which nothing is known
empirically.
5 Tax Reform
The optimal tax analysis can provide important insights, but from the point
of view of actual tax policy, an analysis of tax reform, i.e. the search for
welfare improving directions of change from an initial non-optimal position,
may be more relevant. In this section we consider two examples of tax reform
problems,18 using them again to highlight the central importance of the rela-
tion between female labour supply and productivity in household production
in determining the conclusions.
5.1 The Flat Rate Case
We use the model of the previous section to analyse a tax reform consisting of
a (local) revenue neutral movement away from a position where all households
face the same tax rate, i.e. we initially have a ￿ at rate tax system, which is
also of course a joint taxation system. We shall relax this assumption below,
but for the moment it is useful to highlight certain aspects of the results.
18We draw here on Apps and Rees (1999a), to which the reader is referred for more
extensive discussion and analysis of further possible cases.
15Thus the marginal tax rates tf and tm are equal initially, and we consider
















￿ xm + tm￿ x
0
m
￿ xf + tf￿ x
0
f
Since we assume both ￿ xf < ￿ xm and ￿ x
0
f < ￿ x
0
m < 0 we will have ￿ > 1: Any
one household is made better o⁄ by this reform if and only if





Thus a household is more likely to be made better o⁄ the lower its ratio of
gross male to gross female income, and it is straightforward to show that all
households could be better o⁄, and at least some households must be. For
the latter, we have
Proposition 3: For the given tax reform, on the assumptions ￿ xf < ￿ xm
and ￿ x
0
f < ￿ x
0
m < 0 at least some households are made better o⁄.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that all households are made worse o⁄.

















which contradicts the assumptions.
It is possible to construct special cases in which the condition is satis￿ed
for all households, but it has to be accepted that empirically, since xf may be
16zero for some households, we should expect some households would be made
worse o⁄. Again, however, the welfare e⁄ects depend on the relationship
between household productivity and female labour supply, since this deter-
mines whether the households which may be made worse o⁄ by this reform,
the ones with a su¢ ciently high ratio xm=xf; are in fact higher or lower in
the initial welfare distribution.
5.2 A Progressive Joint Tax System
Suppose we start with a tax system in which there is income splitting, and the
marginal tax rate increases with joint household income. We want to consider
the desirability of progressive income taxation in this context. To simplify,
we assume that there are just two household types, h = 1;2; distinguished
by di⁄erent values of household productivity kh: Also, we take initially the
case in which everyone, both male and female, has the same market wage, w.
Thus the di⁄erences in female labour supply are due entirely to di⁄erences
in domestic productivity, as are the di⁄erences in household pre-tax utility
possibilities. Both men will have the same labour supplies and gross incomes
xm; and we assume that household 2 has the higher female labour supply
and gross income, xf2 > xf1: Each household receives the same lump sum,
a; but household h pays a marginal tax rate th; with t2 > t1. There are nh






xih ￿ a] ￿ R ￿ 0
where R ￿ 0 is an aggregate revenue requirement. We take the social welfare
function as having the same general form as that used in the optimal tax









We consider a tax reform consisting of revenue neutral changes in the tax
rates, dth: The question of interest is: When is a reduction in the progressivity
of the tax system social welfare enhancing?












































is an aggregate household elasticity of gross income with respect to the tax
rate. Now if these elasticities are equal, a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for a reduction in progressivity is that female labour supply be inversely re-
lated to domestic productivity. However, Heckman (1993) argues that the
evidence on male and female labour supply elasticities suggests that higher
female labour supply elasticities result from the fact that labour supplies are
more elastic for individuals, of either gender, who have low labour supply.
Thus it may well be the case that household 1 will have a higher elasticity
than household 2, in which case the condition becomes more stringent. On
the other hand, if xf1 = 0; and
@xf1
@t1 = 0; and the male labour supply elastic-
ities are just equal, then we certainly have e2 > e1; and overall welfare could




1;which could be the case for example if a small
di⁄erence in domestic productivities leads to a substantial increase in female
labour supply.
6 Conclusions
This paper has been concerned with the question of how couples should be
taxed. One reason for the importance of this issue is simply that the over-
whelming majority of individuals live in households formed around couples.
A second reason is that the economic theory of optimal taxation and tax
18reform, at least as it is presented in the mainstream literature, provides lit-
tle guidance on this issue, resting as it does on models of the single person
household. An old insight in the earlier public ￿nance literature is that any
discussion of the taxation of two-person households necessarily involves the
recognition of the importance of household production. In this paper we have
tried to show how a simple model of household production can be used to
help the analysis of optimal taxation and tax reform, and to put the "con-
ventional wisdom", which says that it is optimal to tax women on a separate,
lower tax schedule than men, on a ￿rmer basis. What emerges clearly from
the analysis is how centrally important the relationship between productivity
in household production and female labour supply really is, and how little
we know about it empirically.
The analysis of optimal taxation was carried out entirely within the frame-
work of linear taxation. Though central to the literature, this is a somewhat
restricted framework. In further work, we intend to explore the issues dis-
cussed in this paper in the context of non-linear19 and piecewise linear tax
systems.
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